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Transnational Justice and Democracy
1
 
 
by Rainer Forst 
 
1. Three Dogmas of Political Theory 
 
The title I have chosen seems to signal a tension, even a contradiction, in a number 
of respects. Democracy appears to be a form of political organisation and 
government in which, through general and public participatory procedures, a 
sufficiently legitimate political will is formed which acquires the force of law. Justice, 
by contrast, appears to be a value external to this context which is not so much linked 
to procedures of “input” or “throughput” legitimation but is understood instead as an 
output- or outcome-oriented concept.
2 At times, justice is even understood as an 
otherworldly idea which, when transported into the Platonic cave, merely causes 
trouble and ends up as an undemocratic elite project.
3 In methodological terms, too, 
this difference is sometimes signalled in terms of a contrast between a form of 
“worldly” political thought and “abstract” and otherworldly philosophical reflection on 
justice.
4
In my view, we are bound to talk past the issues to be discussed under the 
heading “transnational justice and democracy” unless we first root out false 
 
                                           
 
1 I presented earlier versions of this paper at the General Conference of the German Association of Political 
Science in Kiel in September 2009, at the Final Conference of the Research Project on “Transnational Justice 
and Democracy” of the Frankfurt Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of Normative Orders” in Bad Homburg 
in September 2010, at the Recon Workshop on “The European Political Order: State-less but Democratic and 
Just?” in Oslo in September/October 2010, at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American 
Philosophical Association in Boston in December 2010, in the Political Theory Colloquium in Frankfurt in 
January 2011 and in the Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy at University College London in February 
2011. I owe special thanks to the collaborators in these research projects and to the commentators on this paper, 
in particular to Jürgen Neyer, Klaus Schlichte, Nicole Deitelhoff, Peter Niesen, Klaus Dieter Wolf, Ayelet Banai, 
Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, Erik O. Eriksen, John Erik Fossum, Kjartan Koch Mikalsen, Daniel Gaus, Ken Baynes, 
Seyla Benhabib, Stefan Gosepath, Julian Culp, Franziska Dübgen, Christian Volk, Dorothea Gädeke, Enrico 
Zoffoli, George Letsas and John Tasioulas. 
2 For example, see Jürgen Neyer, “Justice, not democracy,” in: Rainer Forst and Rainer Schmalz-Bruns (eds), 
Political Legitimacy and Democracy in Transnational Perspective, Recon Report (Oslo: Arena, forthcoming); 
and my reply in the same volume: “Justice and democracy. Comment on Jürgen Neyer.” 
3 Ingeborg Maus, “Der Urzustand,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), John Rawls. Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit (Berlin: 
Akademie, 1998); Harald Müller, Wie kann eine neue Weltordnung aussehen? (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 2008).  
4 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1987).  
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dichotomies such as the ones mentioned. My thesis will be that justice must be 
“secularised” or “grounded” both with regard to how we understand it and to its 
application to relations beyond the state. This thesis clashes with certain erroneous 
dogmas in political theory, to begin with:  
1. the dogma of the essential difference between democracy and justice and their 
potential political incompatibility. 
  Overcoming this assumption in order to develop a theory of transnational 
justice and democracy is only one step in the argument. For such a theory also 
makes it necessary to question two further premises which restrict the scope of both 
justice and democracy, namely 
2. the dogma that the necessary preconditions of a “context of justice” can be 
satisfied only within the confines of a state and 
3. the dogma that democracy must take the form of a practice of a demos organised 
within a state.  
  I will begin with a discussion of the first dogma. 
 
2. Two Pictures of Justice 
Let me begin with a brief reference to Wittgenstein. In the Philosophical 
Investigations, he writes: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, 
for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”
5
                                           
 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), p. 
48e (§ 115). 
 I 
believe that reflection on justice is all too often held captive by a specific, unpolitical 
picture which rests on a particular interpretation of the ancient principle “To each his 
own” (suum cuique). This principle, which has been central to our understanding of 
justice since Plato, is interpreted in such a way that the primary issue is what goods 
individuals receive or deserve as a matter of justice – in other words, the primary 
issue is who “gets” what. The search for answers leads either to comparisons 
between the collections of goods people possess and points to relative conclusions; 
or one asks whether individuals have “enough” of the goods which are vital for 
leading a good life or one befitting a human being, irrespective of comparisons.  
 
4 
Granted, these goods- and distribution-centred, recipient-oriented points of view have 
their point, for distributive justice is, of course, a matter of allocating goods; 
nevertheless this picture conceals essential aspects of justice – in the first place, the 
question of how the goods to be distributed come “into the world,” thus questions of 
production and its just organization. Furthermore, secondly, this picture ignores the 
political question of who determines the structures of production and distribution and 
how, as though there could be a huge distribution machine that only needed to be 
programmed correctly.
6
Finally, in the fourth place, the goods-fixated view of justice also largely 
ignores the question of injustice; for, by concentrating on overcoming deficiencies of 
goods, it treats someone who is deprived of goods and resources as a result of a 
natural catastrophe as equivalent to someone who experiences the same deprivation 
as a result of economic or political exploitation. It is true that assistance is appropriate 
in both cases. However, as I understand the grammar of justice, in the one case it is 
required as an act of moral solidarity, but in the other as an act of justice conditioned 
by the nature of one’s involvement in relations of exploitation and injustice
 But not only would such a machine be problematic, because 
it would mean that justice would no longer be understood as an accomplishment of 
the subjects themselves but would turn them instead into passive recipients; this idea 
also neglects, thirdly, the insight that justified claims to goods do not simply “exist” 
but can only be ascertained discursively through corresponding justification 
procedures in which – and this is the fundamental requirement of justice – all are 
involved as free and equal individuals.  
7 and the 
specific wrong in question. Ignoring this difference can lead one to mistake what is 
actually a requirement of justice for an act of generous “aid.”
8
  For the reasons cited, it is necessary, especially when dealing with questions 
of distributive justice, to recognize the political point of justice and to liberate oneself 
  
                                           
 
6 For the first two points, see especially Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), and my “Radical Justice: On Iris Marion Young’s Critique of the ‘Distributive 
Paradigm’,” Constellations 14, 2007, pp. 260-65. 
7 Here a whole series of cases would have to be distinguished: direct participation in or (joint) causation of 
injustice; indirect participation in injustice by profiting from it, without oneself actively contributing to relations 
of exploitation; and the (“natural”) duty to put an end to unjust relations, even if one does not profit from them 
but possesses the means to overcome them.  
8 See my “A Dialectic of Morality,” in Andreas Follesdal and Thomas Pogge (eds), Real World Justice 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), pp. 27-36.  
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from a false and reified picture which is focused solely on quantities of goods. On the 
contrary, if we follow a second, more appropriate picture, justice should aim at 
intersubjective relations and structures, not at subjective or supposedly objective 
states of the provision of goods. Only by thus taking into consideration the first 
question of justice – namely, the justifiability of social relations and, correspondingly, 
of how much “justificatory power” individuals or groups have in a political context – 
does a radical, critical conception of justice become possible, one which gets at the 
roots of relations of injustice.  
 
3. The Right to Justification 
Here we must first ask what justifies us in speaking of a “false” as opposed to a more 
“appropriate” picture of justice; for after all, the goods- or recipient-centred 
understanding can appeal to the time-honoured principle suum cuique. Is there a 
more original, deeper meaning of justice than this? In my opinion there is. The 
concept of justice possesses a core meaning to which the essential contrasting 
concept is that of arbitrariness,
9
                                           
 
9 See also Rawls’s definition in A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1999), p. 5. For a discussion of arbitrariness and a critique of Philip Pettit’s important view in his Republicanism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), see Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), ch. 3. I cannot go into this here, but I prefer to explain arbitrariness by way of an 
account of justice and justification rather than liberty, mainly because only by having recourse to certain criteria 
of justification can one explain which encroachments on liberty are justifiable and which are not. 
 understood in a social sense, whether it assumes 
the form of arbitrary rule by individuals or by part of the community (for example, a 
class) over others, or of the acceptance of social contingencies which lead to 
asymmetrical positions or relations of domination and are defended and accepted as 
an unalterable fate, even though they are nothing of the sort. Arbitrary rule is the rule 
of some people over others without legitimate reason, i.e., domination, and where 
struggles are conducted against injustice they are first and foremost directed against 
forms of domination of this kind. The underlying impulse that opposes injustice is not 
primarily that of wanting something, or more of something, but of not wanting to be 
dominated, harassed or overruled any longer in one’s claim and basic right to 
justification. This claim involves the demand that no political or social relations should 
exist which cannot be adequately justified towards those involved. Herein resides the  
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profoundly political essence of justice which the principle suum cuique not only fails 
to grasp but tends to conceal; for justice is a matter of who determines who receives 
what – thus the dimension which in Plato is represented by the idea of the Good or 
by the philosopher king. In my picture, the demand for justice is an emancipatory 
one; reflexively speaking, it rests on the claim to be respected as a subject of 
justification, that is, to be respected in one’s dignity as a being who can provide and 
demand justifications. The person who lacks certain goods should not be regarded 
as the primary victim of injustice but the one who does not “count” in the production 
and allocation of goods. 
 
4. Egalitarian Theories 
One can cut different paths through contemporary discussions on justice. However 
the one opened up by the question of the two pictures of justice is especially 
instructive, for from this perspective certain adversaries unexpectedly find 
themselves in the same boat.  
  An example is provided by the recent debate concerning equality. By this is 
actually meant two points of discussion: on the one hand, the question “Equality of 
what?” – of resources, welfare, or capabilities
10 – and, on the other, the question 
“Why equality at all?” From the perspective of the difference between the two pictures 
of justice, however, it becomes apparent that both the advocates and the opponents 
of equality frequently operate with the same understanding, and this often even finds 
expression in a specific image, that of the goddess Justitia as a mother who has to 
divide up a cake and asks herself how this should be done.
11
                                           
 
10 See, especially, Gerald Cohen, “Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,” in Martha 
Nussbaum und Amartya Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 9-29. 
 Egalitarians argue for 
the primacy of the equal distribution of goods, according to which other arguments for 
legitimate unequal distributions – for instance, ones based on need, merit or prior 
claims – then have to be treated as special reasons. Alternatively, an egalitarian 
calculus of need satisfaction – welfare – is posited which serves as the goal of 
11 See, for example, Ernst Tugendhat, Vorlesungen über Ethik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), pp. 373f.; 
Wilfried Hinsch, Gerechtfertigte Ungleichheiten (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), p. 169f.; Stefan Gosepath, Gleiche 
Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), p. 250ff. The cake example, though without the mother, 
can also be found in Isaiah Berlin, “Equality “, in Concepts and Categories, H. Hardy (ed.) (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1981), p. 84.  
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distribution.
12
 
 However in the process the question of how the cake was produced 
and, even more important, who gets to play the role of the mother remains largely 
unthematized. Yet that is the principal question of justice.  
5. Critics of Equality 
Analogous problems are found on the side of the critics of equality. In Harry 
Frankfurt’s view, for example, the defenders of egalitarian conceptions of justice 
cannot be concerned with the value of equality at all; for if you ask them what is so 
bad about inequality, they respond by pointing to the negative consequences of living 
conditions in a society of inequality, in particular to the fact that certain people lack 
important goods for a satisfactory life.
13
So-called “sufficientarians”
  
14 have taken up these arguments and argue that 
“at least the especially important, elementary standards of justice are of a 
nonrelational kind,”
15
These approaches are also open to serious objections. Thus Frankfurt’s 
assertion that the pivotal issue is not how much others have but only whether I have 
“enough,” is valid only when conditions of background justice pertain, that is only 
when others have not previously taken advantage of me. Hence we must look for 
reasons for such background justice elsewhere. 
 and that justice is concerned with creating “conditions of life 
befitting human beings” that can be measured according to “absolute standards of 
fulfilment,” not according to what others have. On this view, a universal conception of 
the goods “necessary for a good life” should be produced with reference to particular 
lists of basic goods.  
But, in addition, the idea of “having enough” or “getting enough” does not get 
at the essence of justice, i.e. the prevention of social domination. Justice is always a 
                                           
 
12 This is especially true of “luck egalitarianism.” For a paradigmatic expression, see Richard Arneson, “Luck 
Egalitarianism: An Interpretation and Defense,” Philosophical Topics 32 (2004): 1-20 and “Luck and Equality,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. (2001), 73-90. For a critique see Elisabeth Anderson, “What 
is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337. 
13 Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” in The Importance of What we Care About (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 143-58, and “Equality and Respect,” in Necessity, Volition, and Love 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 146-54. 
14 Roger Crisp, “Equality, Priority, and Compassion,” Ethics 113, 2003: 745-63. 
15 Angelika Krebs, “Einleitung: Die neue Egalitarismuskritik im Überblick “, in Krebs (ed.), Gleichheit oder 
Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), pp. 17f.   
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“relational” matter; it does not first inquire into subjective or objective states of affairs 
but into relations between human beings and what they owe to each other for what 
reasons. In particular, we do not explain the requirements of justice on the model of 
morally required aid in specific situations of want or need; instead they come into play 
in situations where what is at stake are relations between human beings that are 
fundamentally in need of justification, where those involved are connected by social 
relations of cooperation in the production and distribution of goods – or, as is mostly 
the case, by relations of “negative cooperation “, of coercion or domination (whether 
by legal, economic or political means). It makes a huge difference whether someone 
is deprived of certain goods and opportunities unjustly and without justification or 
whether he or she, for whatever reason, lacks certain goods (for example, as a result 
of a natural catastrophe, as mentioned above). By losing sight of the former context, 
one misses or conceals the problem of justice as well as that of injustice. Justice 
requires that those involved in a context of (positive or negative) cooperation should 
be respected as equals. That means that they should enjoy equal rights to take part 
in the social and political order of justification in which the conditions under which 
goods are produced and distributed are determined.  
 
6. The First Question of Justice 
Let us review the essential points thus far from a constructive perspective. I have 
defined justice as the human capacity to oppose relations of arbitrary rule or 
domination. Domination is rule “without justification” and it is assumed that a just 
social order is one to which free and equal persons could give their assent – not just 
their counterfactual assent but assent based on institutionalised justification 
procedures. This is a recursive implication of the fact that what is at stake in political 
and social justice is norms of an institutional basic structure which claims reciprocal 
and universal validity. Thus a supreme principle holds within such a framework, 
namely the principle of general and reciprocal justification, which states that every 
claim to goods, rights or liberties must be justified in a reciprocal and general 
manner, where one side may not simply project its reasons onto the other but has to 
justify itself discursively.  
This brings us to the central insight for the problem of political and social 
justice, namely that the first question of justice is the question of power. For justice is 
not only a matter of which goods, for which reasons and in what amounts should  
 
9 
legitimately be allocated to whom, but in particular of how these goods come into the 
world in the first place and of who decides on their allocation and how this allocation 
is made. Theories of a predominantly allocative-distributive kind are accordingly 
“oblivious to power” insofar as they conceive of justice exclusively from the “recipient 
side,” and if necessary call for “redistributions,” without emphasizing the political 
question of how the structures of production and allocation of goods are determined 
in the first place. The claim that the question of power is the first question of justice 
means that justice has its proper place where the central justifications for a social 
basic structure must be provided and the institutional ground rules are laid down 
which determine social life from the bottom up. Everything depends, if you will, on the 
relations of justification within a society. Power, understood as the effective 
“justificatory power” of individuals, is the higher-level good of justice.
16 It is the 
“discursive” power to demand and provide justifications and to challenge false 
legitimations. This amounts to an argument for a “political turn” in the debate 
concerning justice and for a critical theory of justice as a critique of relations of 
justification.
17
  A comprehensive theory of political and social justice should be constructed 
on this basis, something at which I can only hint here.
  
18
                                           
 
16 Power is a kind of good that cannot be distributed like a material good, as Iris Young argued in Justice and the 
Politics of Difference, ch. 1. But resources that help to generate power can be distributed, such as means of 
education and information and access to public communication; other such goods are social and political 
positions. I discuss the concept of power in my “Noumenal Power”, Ms. 
 First we must make a 
conceptual distinction between fundamental (minimal) and full (maximal) justice. 
Whereas the task of fundamental justice is to construct a basic structure of 
justification, the task of full justice is to construct a justified basic structure. The 
former is necessary in order to pursue the latter, that is, a “putting-into-effect” of 
justification through constructive, discursive democratic procedures in which the 
“justificatory power” is distributed as evenly as possible among the citizens. In spite 
of the appearance of paradox, this means that fundamental justice is a substantive 
starting point of procedural justice. Based on a moral right to justification, arguments 
are presented for the basic structure in which those who are part of it have real 
17 See Forst, Justification and Critique (Cambridge: Polity, forthcoming). 
18 For a more detailed discussion see Forst, Contexts of Justice and The Right to Justification.  
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opportunities to codetermine the institutions of this structure in a reciprocal and 
general manner. Fundamental justice guarantees all citizens an effective status “as 
equals “. 
 
7.Transnational Contexts of Justice and Justification 
Once the first dogma of recipient- and outcome-centred justice and the assumed 
incompatibility between justice and democracy which rests on that picture of justice 
has been surmounted, the path leading beyond the two other dogmas is already 
marked out. For it became clear that justice presupposes in the first instance specific 
practices of justification – within a basic structure of justification – and that this praxis 
is what we mean by democracy: those who are subject to norms should also be the 
authority which justifies these very norms – as active subjects of justification and not 
just in mente or in proxy or expert discourses.
19 The goddess Justitia does not come 
into the world to dispense gifts; her task is instead to banish arbitrary rule, i.e. 
domination. Democracy is the best possible form of political order to accomplish this 
and to secure the political autonomy of those who are supposed to be both subjects 
and authors of the law – in accordance with their dignity as autonomous subjects of 
justification.
20
How should this result be interpreted in the transnational context? Let us first 
consider the position – the second false dogma – which asserts that only a state 
context can provide the preconditions for localising – i.e., grounding and realizing – 
justice. As I said, the proper place of justice is where a threat of arbitrary rule exists, 
where a context of cooperation could be or is degenerating into a context of 
domination. Thus, one might conclude, the existence of a certain context of social 
cooperation is an unavoidable precondition for a context of justice. 
  
A number of theories have drawn this conclusion. In the first place, we must 
mention that of John Rawls. For his point of view – which leads him to locate social 
                                           
 
19 This marks a basic point of disagreement between Jürgen Neyer’s view and mine. See Neyer, “Justice, not 
Democracy: Legitimacy in the European Union,” and my “Justice and Democracy: Comments on J. Neyer, 
‘Justice, not Democracy’,” both in: Rainer Forst and Rainer Schmalz-Bruns (eds), Political Legitimacy and 
Democracy in Transnational Perspective, Recon Report, Oslo: Arena, 2011. 
20 See my “The Grounds of Critique. On the Concept of Human Dignity in Social Orders of Justification,” tr. 
Ciaran Cronin, Philosophy and Social Criticism, forthcoming.  
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justice in the national sphere and to regard the international domain as one in which 
certain (minimal) human rights are valid and otherwise only duties of assistance
21 – 
is not so much a state-centred as a cooperation-centred one. It is often 
underestimated how much weight Rawls attaches to the “most fundamental” idea of a 
“society as a fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the 
next,” which he consistently situates at the centre of his theory.
22
Some theories develop this idea in a more communitarian direction, so that 
“common sentiments” or “shared understandings” within a nation become the 
essential presupposition for a context of justice;
 According to Rawls, 
only such a society provides the resources – in the twofold sense of material and 
normative resources – which are the presupposition for a “well-ordered society.” Only 
here are the reciprocity conditions and the social cohesion – economic, political and 
moral – which a just society requires to be found. 
23 others, by contrast, highlight the 
state as the central context. Thomas Nagel expresses this as follows: “Justice is 
something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand 
in a strong political relation. It is, in the standard terminology, an associative 
obligation.”
24
   The arguments of Rawls and Nagel carry considerable weight because on a 
relational view a context of justice is in fact a particular context of social and political 
relations which gives rise to special demands. Nevertheless these approaches are 
problematic because they use a conclusion as a premise when they argue that a 
particular institutional context of social cooperation or a political community is a 
 The essential aspects of such a “strong political relation” are the 
existence of a collectively authorised source of law and the non-voluntariness of the 
relation – that is, that the law expresses the will of the citizens (or at least claims to 
do so) and that this must also be the case, normatively speaking, if citizens are not to 
be subjected to external constraints without adequate justification. Positive normative 
authority and factual coercion must coexist in order to form to a context of justice.  
                                           
 
21 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
22 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 5. See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 9: “Fully to understand a conception of justice we must make 
explicit the conception of social cooperation from which it derives.” 
23 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Michael 
Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983). 
24 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, 2005: 113-47, here p. 121.  
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necessary precondition of the application of the concept of social or political justice. 
As explained above, Justitia is a man-made deity who comes into the world to banish 
social arbitrariness, and this means that she has her (combative) place were 
arbitrariness prevails among human beings or where it is a possibility. In such cases 
she calls for specific institutions, for example – traditionally speaking – for the rule of 
law where the “state of nature” existed; but then she cannot presuppose these 
institutions of justice. She presupposes the status of persons as beings who have a 
right to justification and she demands that a basic structure of justification be 
constructed where arbitrary rule has to be excluded; but she does not demand this 
only where a positive (i.e. legally constituted) institutional basic structure of positive 
(i.e. mutually beneficial) cooperation already exists. Thus we do not have to object to 
Rawls, as certain globalist cosmopolitans assume, that a “global basic structure” 
already in fact exists comparable to a national one,
25 since this is a competition that 
cosmopolitans can hardly win; nor do we need to object to Nagel that global 
governance institutions also exercise legal coercion and claim authority for this 
(though this is an important argument to make).
26 Instead we have to go beyond any 
dichotomous thinking in terms of “state” vs. “world” and accept the existence of a 
plurality of different contexts of social and structural justice (as contexts of political or 
social rule) or injustice (as contexts of domination) and thereby correctly situate or 
“ground” justice – informed by an appropriate and “realistic” social-scientific analysis 
of “what is.”
27
  Such a “practice-dependent” approach to justice, to use Andrea Sangiovanni’s 
apt phrase,
 
28
                                           
 
25 See the original (and later differentiated) view of Charles Beitz in his Political Theory and International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), Pt. 3, and Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), Ch. 6.  
 though in a different sense from his, would imply that a context of 
political or social justice exists wherever social (or legal or political) relations with a 
structure of cooperation in some minimally stable form exist. But this importantly 
includes, besides positive cooperation, negative cooperation, i.e. forms of 
26 See Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, “Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 34, 
2006: 147-75. 
27 Here I draw on my argument in “Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice,” in: Metaphilosophy 32, 
2001: 160-79, reprinted in Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 169-87. 
28 Andrea Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 16, 
2008, pp. 137-64.  
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unjustifiable coercion and of exploitation, in short, domination; and it is hard to 
dispute that such forms of social or political domination exist at the transnational level 
even in our “postcolonial” times.
29 Here a complex system of asymmetry and its 
reproduction exists with numerous structures and relations in need of justification. 
This is why, reflexively speaking, the first task of justice would be to construct 
transnational structures of justification – structures which would have to be concrete 
enough to turn relations of domination into relations of justification and general 
enough to leave room for disputes and contestation concerning the analysis and 
evaluation of existing social relations and structures.
30
With respect to “practice-dependence,” we thus need to distinguish between 
positive and negative practice-dependence. The positive version refers to already 
established forms of rule and coercion by the state, or at least by legal institutions 
which claim normative authority and always harbour the danger that arbitrariness 
distorts given forms of cooperation. The negative version, by contrast, refers to forms 
of domination in need of justification and institutional “taming”; thus these practices 
are not sufficiently institutionalized. Positive practice-dependence comes in degrees, 
depending on the thickness of already institutionalized political and legal contexts, 
 Justice tracks, as it were, 
arbitrariness and forms of domination and coercion wherever they occur. The 
assumption that this would first require an already existing positive, institutional social 
or legal context of cooperation fails to grasp the correct order of things: the first thing 
is injustice (i.e. asymmetrical social relations without justification) in the world and 
then justice calls for structures of justification and banishes human arbitrariness. . 
Political and social justice is a relational as well as an institutional virtue; it does not 
refer to all relations between human beings, but to those which exhibit forms of 
positive rule or forms of domination – whether in the state or in the “state of nature,” 
in the national or the international or the transnational domain in general.  
                                           
 
29 See the accounts in Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order. Power, Values and the Constitution of International 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), and Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, Susan K. Sell 
(eds), Who Governs the Globe? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
30 I am in agreement with Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice. Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), esp. chs. 2 and 4, that the latter reflexive dimension is important; 
I think, however, that critical social analysis is capable of providing us with sufficient empirical knowledge 
about existing relations and structures without justification to locate substantive demands of fundamental justice.  
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and so does domination, whether it be of an economic, a cultural or a political kind. 
But both practices mark contexts of justice. 
Connected with the distinction between positive and negative practice-
dependence is another important one which one-sided views of positive practice-
dependence do not sufficiently pay tribute to, though it plays a role in their argument: 
there are institutions necessary to realize justice, depending on context, and there 
are practices and institutions which make justice necessary – in a way, they “call for” 
justice.
31 Call these justice-realizing and justice-necessitating practices and 
institutions. It is a mistake to identify the two, for that would mean that we could not 
refer to injustice or the demand for justice outside of already established institutions. 
As the classic theorists of natural right argued, the injustice of the “state of nature” – 
i.e. the arbitrary rule of some over others in a pre-institutional form – or of the already 
established state – such as a monarchy according to Filmer’s patriarchal view
32 or 
the rule of the rich in Rousseau’s Second Discourse
33 – both needed to be overcome 
by establishing a just and legitimate political order. The first task to be accomplished 
to that end must be to establish a sufficient order of justification such that those 
subjected by positive forms of rule or “wild” forms of domination are no longer just 
objects but also subjects, i.e. they become autonomous normative authorities. 
Following Kant and at the same time going beyond his idea of the only “innate” or 
“original” (angeboren) right of human beings,
34
If it were possible to reconstruct the respective existing positive and negative 
contexts of rule, domination and coercion adequately, this would already go a long 
 the “ultimate” ground for this idea of 
justice-generating practices of justification is the basic human right to justification – 
i.e. the right which protects against being forced to live under institutions or being 
subjected to norms that cannot properly be justified towards those subjected as free 
and equal agents of justification. This is a reflexive right which calls for certain 
practices of justification in the sense of fundamental justice.  
                                           
 
31 See, for example, Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality,” pp. 137 and 159. 
32 As famously criticized in Locke’s First Treatise of Government.  
33 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, tr. F. Philip (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
34 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
6:237 (30).  
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way towards answering the question concerning the contexts of justice. However, the 
complexity of Justitia would then become especially apparent because the 
corresponding basic structures of justification – from the state to the globe – would 
have to track these different contexts. This is why justice is still, in some sense, a 
goddess or a context-transcending idea, but one which does not do the work for us; 
we have to do it ourselves, as political and reflexive agents. 
   
8. Demoi of subjection and justification 
A critical theory of transnational justice does not paint an idealised image of perfect 
global distribution as an “end state” (Nozick), nor does it proceed from an “original 
position” involving all human beings. Instead it has a contextual starting point, for it 
traces the actually existing relations of positive rule and of domination and 
exploitation, of structural asymmetries and arbitrary rule, in order to call for the 
establishment of relations of justification, and hence of justifiability, wherever they are 
encountered. This opens up a complex panorama of relations, structures, actors and 
necessary institutions which appears highly confusing. . The important point, 
however, is that justice tracks injustice, and hence the question “‘world state’ or 
‘world of states’?” is not the primary concern from the perspective of justice. At some 
point we need to consider what form the structures of justification would have to 
assume in order to tame domination through transnational and international 
institutions, but before that kind of construction the first task is the “realistic” 
reconstruction of relations of domination. 
  As a consequence, the first constructive task of justice is to produce structures 
in which arbitrary rule is banished and fair relations of justification are realised – 
structures in which those who are exposed to rule or domination, whether of an 
economic, a political or a legal kind, can bring the “coercion towards the better 
argument” (to modify a formulation by Habermas) to bear against those who exercise 
such rule or domination. This is where democracy comes into play, to turn to the third 
dogma of political theory in this connection, which asserts that democracy calls for a 
demos organized within a state. Democracy, as I said above, is the term for a 
normative order in which those who are subject to binding legal norms should also be 
the normative authority that deliberates and decides about these norms, in an active 
sense in the context of a practice of justification. We are familiar with democratic 
normative orders within which different forms of such practices of justification exist,  
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and we also know that they are riven by incessant conflicts over whether they can 
redeem their claim to justification. One need only think of issues like campaign 
financing, the 5% hurdle, plebiscites, and the like. Such sites and institutions also 
exist at the transnational and international levels, though they mostly remain at levels 
of development which, as in the case of the UN, reflect the post-war balance of 
power or simply global relations of economic power.  
  If we understand democracy in such a way that it seeks to subsume the 
exercise of rule or domination under relations of effective justification and 
authorisation of norms by those who are subject to them, then the assumption that 
this requires a definite and single demos is problematic. For the demoi which are 
constituted as states are already integrated into such diverse networks of 
international and transnational rule or domination, formal and informal, that the 
“congruence condition” (Zürn)
35 of the authorisation and legitimate exercise of rule is 
no longer satisfied in a number of ways. There are demoi which, to simplify, are 
subjected to external power in different ways, and there are demoi which profit from 
such subjection – and there are hybrid forms of the two. But more than that, if we 
heed the principle of turning those subjected into agents with normative authority, it is 
questionable whether the existing demoi within state borders are generally the main 
or the only agents of justice and democracy.
36
In my view, processes of political recuperation already merit the title 
“democratic” when they succeed in creating effective relations of justification that 
curb domination, for instance through effective contestation,
 Justice, and with it democracy, are 
recuperative institutions, not ones which found institutions ex nihilo; demoi constitute 
themselves through existing relations of rule or domination – which transcend state 
borders in more than one way constituting new social and political agents within and 
beyond existing polities.  
37
                                           
 
35 Michael Zürn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), p. 17. 
 even if they remain a 
36 Despite important agreements with the view of James Bohman, Democracy across Borders: From demos to 
demoi (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), we differ over how far the notion of demoi needs to be redefined 
according to existing relations of domination that transcend existing polities. In his federalist view, these remain 
the essential political agents forming higher-order political entities such as the EU. 
37 See Philip Pettit, “Democracy, National and International”, The Monist 89, 2006: 301-24. I do not follow 
Pettit’s sharp distinction between an “authorial” and an “editorial” notion of democratic control; in order to be 
 
  
 
17 
step removed from complete recuperation and containment. A global 
constitutionalisation such as that proposed by Jürgen Habermas is not global 
democracy, much less deliberative democracy, in the guise of a world state.
38
Such practices of justice are no more confined to the long-established 
institutions and political ways of thinking than are the relations of domination to which 
persons all over the world are exposed. In political theory, we have to think of justice 
and democracy in terms of processes of recuperation and of the increase of relations 
of justification, not in terms of fixed and narrow ideals. For democracy and justice are 
ultimately autonomous practices which create their own forms. 
 But 
wherever the privileged are forced to renounce their prerogatives because, having 
been exposed, the ground has been pulled out from under them and justifiable 
counterpower is being mobilised – wherever this occurs and relations of justification 
are established which reclaim normative authority it marks an increase in democracy. 
The difference from attempts at democratization within societies such as ours can be 
large, but it seems to me to be a matter of degree, not of kind. Democracy 
progresses – often only in modest steps – where arbitrary and insufficiently justified 
rule, whether it be political, legal or economic, is exposed and ultimately subjected to 
the justificatory authority of those affected. This is a question of justice – the question 
of justice.  
 
9. Two Pictures of Europe 
The essential lesson that follows from this for thinking about democracy and justice 
within the European Union is that we should be sceptical of free-standing 
conceptions of its telos or finalité. Realistically speaking, the EU has grown into a 
powerful supranational, international and transnational polity sui generis, which 
means that the question of its legitimacy needs to be answered in a reflexive and 
democratic way,
39
                                                                                                                                    
 
democratic, a basic structure of justification has to contain both elements, combined within practices of 
justification. Only in that way can domination be structurally avoided. 
 but such that the main focus is on the power-relations within and 
38 Jürgen Habermas, “Does the Cosmopolitanization of International Law Still Have a Chance?”, in The Divided 
West (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 115-93. 
39 As emphasized by Erik O. Eriksen, The Unfinished Democratization of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); Bohman, Democracy across Borders, Ch. 4, and Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, “Democratic Legitimacy, 
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beyond this entity.
40
  If we think back to the two pictures of justice with which I began, an alternative 
opens up for the EU as a political project. For it is quite possible that it will not 
develop in the direction called for by the second, apt picture of justice, but that it will 
become a model for a transnational polity according to the first picture. This would 
mean that democratic justice would be sacrificed for certain levels of the provision of 
goods and that such output, even if unequally distributed, would be seen as providing 
it with legitimacy. That would go along with an increase in the standard of living for 
many as well as further elitist and technocratic forms of rule, not to mention internal 
and external domination. Thus it would represent a diminution of politics on a large 
scale – especially so if the citizens of Europe did not even regard these pictures as a 
basic alternative. 
 The famous “legitimation question” is the question of which 
structures of justification need to be established in order to recuperate – i.e. tame and 
legitimise – the exercise and effects of power, rule and domination which exist on the 
various regional, national and transnational levels. Within the legal realm of the EU, 
this is already a Herculean task, but it is even more so with respect to the equally 
important dimension of the relations between the EU and states, institutions and 
persons outside its jurisdiction which form various demoi of subjection. How it deals 
with migrants, neighbouring states and the many regions of the world it affects (and 
sometimes dominates) through its policies, be they agricultural or ecological, for 
example, will also determine whether it can claim to be a just polity.  
 
Translated by Ciaran Cronin 
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